So ballots are printed for an election on VoteSecure paper. The ballot is printed on heavy stock that is coated to prevent bleed through. That is to prevent a voting mark on one side bleeding through to the other side. In addition, there is a registration mark on the ballot to ensure both sides of the ballot are aligned and the calibration of the printer is good. This is to ensure that if there is bleed through (which isn't supposed to be possible on VoteSecure paper) any mark on one side, will not accidentally mark a vote bubble on the opposite side.
The audit had numerous examples of ballots that suffered bleed through. The paper stock wasn't VoteSecure. The registration marks on these ballots is completely out of alignment, indicating ballots were printed on machines that were not properly calibrated.
How could this happen?
It turns out, the voting stations had 2 printers that could generate ballots "on demand". So they could print ballots on site.
The ballots that were printed by the certified printing company prior to the election appear to be fine. All the problems detected appear to have been generated on site by the "ballot on demand" printers. The audit found numerous ballots that are printed on thin paper stock of a different type than the VoteSecure stock used by the original ballot printing company.
The problem with the ballots was evident almost immediately and was reported as "Sharpiegate" during the election, but quickly excused and covered up by the county and the mainstream media. The warning signs appeared very early and ignored by county officials.
"Most secure election ever".