Save America, Now.

Phrozen said:

Now, what happens? The A-supporters say to themselves: "We are in trouble. Polls suggest A is going to lose if we just vote A>B>C>D as is our honest opinion. But if we exaggeratedly vote A>D>B>C downgrading A's main rivals as far as we can, then maybe A will have a chance." The B-supporters say "those rotten A-supporters for sure are going to exaggerate and effectively get twice the A-versus-B discriminating power as if they were honest. We cannot sit still and just take that. We have to fight back by also exaggerating: B>D>C>A." And similarly the C-supporters say "we will not just sit back and be robbed of our deserved victory by those dishonest exaggerating scum. We will also exaggerate: C>D>A>B." (And by the way, they are completely right. C would definitely lose to A or B if they just sat there.)

Incidentally, some purists may quibble: why did the A-fan voters decide to exaggerate? Well the C-fans felt forced to do so because, given that the A- and B-fans already chose to exaggerate, the C-voters knew that C could not win without exaggeration. But all three kinds of voters do not know what the others are going to do and how many of them are going to do it (nor even how many of them there are), and hence have to guess, and their guess is "most of those rotters are probably going to exaggerate"! So based on this guess, they feel they too must exaggerate to get any chance of victory. (And that feeling is always accurate in the sense that, if some appropriate fraction of the opposing voters exaggerated, then [1] our candidate would be sure to lose to a rival, but [2] by such exaggeration we could regain the victory.)

The result of the new exaggerated votes is: D, the worst candidate in the eyes of all, wins the election. Guaranteed. As we said, this happens with the Borda system and also with every Condorcet method.

In contrast, with range voting the A voters will exaggerate thus: A=99, B=C=D=0, and if everybody acts that way, then C will (deservedly) be elected. (There is no advantage a range voter gains by dishonestly scoring D above B and C – this can't help A win versus B and/or C and simply incurs risk that D will win. But there is sometimes advantage for Condorcet or Borda voters.) C also wins with IRV and plurality. This is an example of the fact that range voting is designed to exhibit only a mild degradation in reaction to dishonestly-exaggerated "strategic voting." With Condorcet and Borda, the allergic reaction is not mild: it is "anaphylactic shock."

Click to expand...

Wowbagger said:

This is really stupid. It's basically saying that range voting will in effect act exactly the same as first-past-the-post. And it only works if A/B/C are at about equal standing -- if A is clearly behind, its followers will strategically game their votes and give 99 to B or C, whichever they hate less.

It's not even an argument against IRV -- they admit that it would have the same result as range voting. It's argument against Borda count (which I'm not a fan of) and Condorcet methods.

And think about their conclusion. They say, quite-matter-of-factly, that C deserves to win. Why? A, B, and C are all despised by 2/3 of the country. D is one that everyone would rather have than any of the other second choices. If A, B or C is elected, 1/3 of the country is happy, the other 2/3 is unhappy. If D is elected, everyone is disappointed but content. Is it really an objective fact that C would be a better choice than D? I mean, Sarah Fucking Palin could conceivably drum up the support of 1/3 of America. This is basically saying that, if she runs against two other candidates (say, two democrats), and has slightly more support than either of them individually, she should win.

Meanwhile, in IRV, in the 2 democrats vs. Sarah Palin situation, after the weaker democrat is knocked out of the running, most of their votes will go to the other one, and we won't have to deal with an immediate 37% approval rating President Palin.

Click to expand...

Phrozen said:

IRV leads to 2 party domination and doesn't in any eliminate strategic voting which you're so concerned about. There is no perfect system, but range voting is the best system of the bunch.

e.g. This is maximum stupidity when it comes to voting. Vote completely opposite of your preferred outcome and you can make your candidate win. Sounds like a brilliant system. RangeVoting.org - IRV example where voting for somebody makes him lose

IRV fails both of these important criteria:

If somebody increases their vote for candidate C (leaving the rest of their vote unchanged) that should not worsen C's chances of winning the election.
If somebody decreases their vote for candidate B (leaving the rest of their vote unchanged) that should not improve B's chances of winning the election.

Click to expand...

Wowbagger said:

Monotonicity isn't the only criterion to use here.

There's a whole list of them on this site:
FairVote.org | Single-winner Voting Method Comparison Chart

Range voting performs poorly against resistance to spoilers, the later-no-harm criterion, even the majority favorite criterion.

I've run through all the three-party possibilities, and there's only one scenario where non-monotonic "gaming" the system would work, and it's very risky:


Let's say you have three parties, Bush, Gore and Nader, where Nader as a "spoiler" for Gore. The scale of first-choice popularity is Bush > Gore > Nader, but more voters would prefer Gore over Bush (it's just that many of them like Nader more than both).

In IRV, Nader would get eliminated first, and the Nader voters who ranked Gore higher than Bush would ensure Gore wins. This is a strength of IRV: how spoilers don't end up spoiling.

The non-monotonic strategic move that I mentioned would be: Bush voters would have to put Nader on the top of the ballot, and try to get GORE eliminated first! For this to be possible, of course, Nader would have be very popular already (enough to overtake Gore from these strategic votes), and Bush would have to have such a lead over Gore that he'd be safe from getting eliminated first (but remember, he's also got a small enough lead to lose if Nader were removed). AND -- once Gore is eliminated -- you'd have rely on enough Gore voters ranking Bush higher than Nader to have Bush win when it comes down to Bush vs. Nader.

So yes, putting Nader on top of Bush could theoretically get Bush elected, but there are several unlikely things happening at once here (in fact, one of your own links makes the argument that Gore voters would be very unlikely to prefer the other major party over a "fringe" party), and the move is very risky; by undermining Bush's narrow majority in "first" ranks, you run the risk of it backfiring and him being eliminated completely in the first round.



How would range voting handle this situation? I doubt the Bush voters would do anything besides giving Bush 100 and the other two 0. If your a Gore fan who's sympathetic to Nader, you might give Gore 100, Bush 0, and Nader 50. Green fanatics would give Nader 100 and the other two 0. More moderate fans of Nader might consider giving Nader 100, Gore 50 and Bush 0... but if Gore and Bush are in the lead, wouldn't this be like giving a "half-vote" between them? A much better idea would be to give Nader 100, Gore 100 and Bush 0.

And what if Nader is actually competitive with the other two? Suddenly the sympathizers who gave Gore 100 and Nader 50 are going to need to make a choice -- which one would they prefer? After all, if Nader might take the whole thing, giving Gore 100 and Nader 50 is like giving a "half-vote" for Gore, and who'd want weaken their voting power like that?

Eventually you'd just everyone voting 100 on one candidate and 0 on the others. How would this be any different from the system we have now?

Click to expand...

• There are a bunch of different positive aspects to look for in voting systems. Range voting fails most of them. The only one IRV fails is monotonicity.
• That is not saying that IRV fails monotonicity all the time, or even often. It just says that such a situation is theoretically possible.
• In order to actually have a situation where IRV fails monotonicity, you'd have to set a very particular scenario, with votes laid out in a very particular way, and you'd have to unleash a very risky strategy involving getting some of your voters shifting strategically, but not too many of them. This is not very likely to pay off.
• Range voting improves upon this scenario in basically no way at all. Gaming your range votes isn't a possibility, it's a dependable certainty. Who in their right mind would give a score higher than zero to a less preferred candidate that has a chance at winning? Even your example admits that this will happen.

Goshin said:

drugs
Decriminalize all drugs. legalize weed. Portugal has done this and seen extremely great results in the areas of addiction treatment and consul, and decreased ODs and diseases that are spread. This will also drop the prison population

I will surround myself with advisers who pass tests relating specifically to what they are advising me on. No friends or family will be hired just because they are that. If they have new ideas, different ideas, that seem to work better than my general beginnings, i will not be inflexible and will use the best path possible in forging a new, stronger america.

Thank you.

Click to expand...

Goshin said:

i should really go through these pages again and rework my proposals

Click to expand...

Goshin said:

like 2 or 3 us states you mean

and i'd legalize it and tax it

new industry

Click to expand...

sKILLz said:

You really should go outside and get a life.

Click to expand...