Monotonicity
isn't the only criterion to use here.
There's a whole list of them on this site:
FairVote.org | Single-winner Voting Method Comparison Chart
Range voting performs poorly against resistance to spoilers, the later-no-harm criterion, even the majority favorite criterion.
I've run through all the three-party possibilities, and there's only one scenario where non-monotonic "gaming" the system would work, and it's very risky:
Let's say you have three parties, Bush, Gore and Nader, where Nader as a "spoiler" for Gore. The scale of first-choice popularity is Bush > Gore > Nader, but more voters would prefer Gore over Bush (it's just that many of them like Nader more than both).
In IRV, Nader would get eliminated first, and the Nader voters who ranked Gore higher than Bush would ensure Gore wins. This is a strength of IRV: how spoilers don't end up spoiling.
The non-monotonic strategic move that I mentioned would be: Bush voters would have to put Nader on the top of the ballot, and try to get GORE eliminated first! For this to be possible, of course, Nader would have be very popular already (enough to overtake Gore from these strategic votes), and Bush would have to have such a lead over Gore that he'd be safe from getting eliminated first (but remember, he's also got a small enough lead to lose if Nader were removed). AND -- once Gore is eliminated -- you'd have rely on enough Gore voters ranking Bush higher than Nader to have Bush win when it comes down to Bush vs. Nader.
So yes, putting Nader on top of Bush could theoretically get Bush elected, but there are several unlikely things happening at once here (in fact, one of your own links makes the argument that Gore voters would be very unlikely to prefer the other major party over a "fringe" party), and the move is very risky; by undermining Bush's narrow majority in "first" ranks, you run the risk of it backfiring and him being eliminated completely in the first round.
How would range voting handle this situation? I doubt the Bush voters would do anything besides giving Bush 100 and the other two 0. If your a Gore fan who's sympathetic to Nader, you might give Gore 100, Bush 0, and Nader 50. Green fanatics would give Nader 100 and the other two 0. More moderate fans of Nader might consider giving Nader 100, Gore 50 and Bush 0... but if Gore and Bush are in the lead, wouldn't this be like giving a "half-vote" between them? A much better idea would be to give Nader 100, Gore 100 and Bush 0.
And what if Nader is actually competitive with the other two? Suddenly the sympathizers who gave Gore 100 and Nader 50 are going to need to make a choice -- which one would they prefer? After all, if Nader might take the whole thing, giving Gore 100 and Nader 50 is like giving a "half-vote" for Gore, and who'd want weaken their voting power like that?
Eventually you'd just everyone voting 100 on one candidate and 0 on the others. How would this be any different from the system we have now?