[TW Legal Gurus] lexis-nexus and other law resources?

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Fubar
03-20-2006, 07:24 AM
I need to find some cases and just more information about a charge i'm facing in Georgia.

I've :google: till i'm blue in the face.

I have found the code section online so I have the defination of my charge, but I need more information, case precedents, mandatory sentencing guidlines ??

So where can I go to find some of this information (online) my next stop is a law library soon.

thanks fukkers

coombz
03-20-2006, 07:26 AM
hey come on post the definition of your charge for us :>>

you're not that guy who wanted to know how much trouble he'd get in for urinating on a cop car after being stopped for speeding are you?

sereneDelusions
03-20-2006, 07:27 AM
hey come on post the definition of your charge for us :>>


definitely...more info is needed.

Infinite
03-20-2006, 07:31 AM
yeah tell us what you did.

also, dont waste your time looking **** up until you've hit up a law librarian. librarians are a wealth of knowledge. :)

r1cko
03-20-2006, 07:33 AM
t-minus 20 minutes before pax "the fudgepacking kyke lawyer" turns up.... you may have to draw a company logo in return for his services, however

Fubar
03-20-2006, 08:12 AM
Involuntary Manslaughter 3

ImperialIPA
03-20-2006, 08:15 AM
Involuntary Manslaughter 3

:huh:

This sounds epic...

Dude, you need a real ****ing lawyer... not tribalwar. Call one NOW.

Fubar
03-20-2006, 08:21 AM
I'm going to represent myself, i'm a pretty smart fellow.

ImperialIPA
03-20-2006, 08:23 AM
I'm going to represent myself, i'm a pretty smart fellow.

Judges HATE people like you... you are going to **** up some bit of protocol, or file some paper late, and you are going to go to jail.

ImperialIPA
03-20-2006, 08:23 AM
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION

O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-3 (2005)

***167; 16-5-3. Involuntary manslaughter


(a) A person commits the offense of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act when he causes the death of another human being without any intention to do so by the commission of an unlawful act other than a felony. A person who commits the offense of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years.

(b) A person commits the offense of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner when he causes the death of another human being without any intention to do so, by the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm. A person who commits the offense of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as for a misdemeanor.

HISTORY: Laws 1833, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 784; Code 1863, ***167;***167; 4224, 4225, 4226; Code 1868, ***167;***167; 4261, 4262, 4263; Code 1873, ***167;***167; 4327, 4328, 4329; Code 1882, ***167;***167; 4327, 4328, 4329; Penal Code 1895, ***167;***167; 67, 68, 69; Penal Code 1910, ***167;***167; 67, 68, 69; Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1009, 26-1010; Ga. L. 1951, p. 737, ***167; 1; Code 1933, ***167; 26-1103, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, ***167; 1; Ga. L. 1984, p. 397, ***167; 1.

NOTES:
LAW REVIEWS. --For survey article on criminal law and procedure, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 89 (1982). For annual survey on criminal law and procedure, 42 Mercer L. Rev. 141 (1990). For article, "New Challenges for the Georgia General Assembly: Survey of Child Endangerment Statutes," see 7 Ga. St. B.J. 8 (2001).
For note discussing the felony-murder rule, and proposing legislation to place limitations on Georgia's felony-murder statute, see 9 Ga. St. B.J. 462 (1973).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

ANALYSIS

General Consideration

Intent

Causation

Unlawful Act Involuntary Manslaughter

Lawful Act -- Unlawful Manner Involuntary Manslaughter

Criminal Negligence

Indictment

Jury Instructions

Indictment

Application Generally


GENERAL CONSIDERATION

EDITOR'S NOTES. --
In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Code 1863, ***167;***167; 4222, 4224, former Code 1868, ***167;***167; 4258, 4261, former Code 1873, ***167;***167; 4324, 4327, former Code 1882, ***167;***167; 4324, 4327, former Penal Code 1895, ***167;***167; 65, 67, former Penal Code 1910, ***167;***167; 65, 67, and former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009, as they read prior to revision of title by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

FORMER CODE 1933, ***167; 26-1103 (SEE O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-3) IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR CLASSIFYING IMPROPERLY. State v. Edwards, 236 Ga. 104, 222 S.E.2d 385 (1976).

THE FIRST ELEMENT OF THE CORPUS DELICTI is that the person alleged to have been killed is actually dead. Vassy v. State, 166 Ga. App. 854, 305 S.E.2d 664 (1983).

INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER REQUIRES INTENT TO DO ACT FROM WHICH DEATH RESULTS, but does not require intent to kill. Hardrick v. State, 96 Ga. App. 670, 101 S.E.2d 99 (1957) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

THERE CAN BE NO INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER WHERE INTENTION IS TO KILL. Jackson v. State, 69 Ga. App. 707, 26 S.E.2d 485 (1943) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

WHEN ONE VOLUNTARILY SHOOTS AT ANOTHER AND THE SHOT KILLS, THE HOMICIDE CANNOT BE INVOLUNTARY; and where, under no rational view of the facts, the killing can be involuntary homicide, judge should not confuse jury by charge on law concerning that offense. Harris v. State, 55 Ga. App. 189, 189 S.E. 680 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

EVERYONE IS PRESUMED TO INTEND NATURAL, PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF CONDUCT, particularly if unlawful and dangerous to safety and lives of others. Jackson v. State, 204 Ga. 47, 48 S.E.2d 864 (1984) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER IS AN UNINTENTIONAL HOMICIDE. Coggins v. State, 227 Ga. 426, 181 S.E.2d 47 (1971).

THERE ARE TWO TYPES OF INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER, both involving death of another human being without any intention to do so; former Code 1933, ***167; 26-1103 (see O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-3(a)) concerns itself with type of involuntary manslaughter which is applicable only to those cases wherein death results by commission of unlawful act other than a felony. Ruff v. State, 150 Ga. App. 238, 257 S.E.2d 203 (1979).

FORMER CODE 1933, ***167; 26-1103 (SEE O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-3(B)) IS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF FORMER CODE 1933, ***167; 26-1103 (SEE O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-3(A)). Maloof v. State, 139 Ga. App. 787, 229 S.E.2d 560 (1976).

VEHICULAR DEATHS have been excepted from other forms of involuntary manslaughter and established as misdemeanors except in cases of reckless driving or vehicular offenses connected with police vehicles. Berrian v. State, 139 Ga. App. 571, 228 S.E.2d 737 (1976).
The trial court did not err in failing to compel the state to prosecute the defendant under the involuntary manslaughter statute rather than the vehicular homicide statute, for the General Assembly made a rational distinction between the two offenses. Williams v. State, 171 Ga. App. 546, 320 S.E.2d 389 (1984).

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT CONVICTION. --There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-21(a)(2), where he willingly participated in a gunfight in a crowded parking lot, which resulted in a fatal shooting of an innocent bystander; the fact that defendant's co-defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, based on the underlying crime of reckless conduct, did not provide a basis for defendant's challenge to his own conviction, as these were different acts committed by different defendants. Barber v. State, Ga. App. , S.E.2d , 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 362 (Apr. 7, 2005).

CITED in Byars v. State, 92 Ga. App. 511, 88 S.E.2d 818 (1955); Teal v. State, 122 Ga. App. 532, 177 S.E.2d 840 (1970); Henderson v. State, 227 Ga. 68, 179 S.E.2d 76 (1970); Tate v. State, 123 Ga. App. 18, 179 S.E.2d 307 (1970); Teasley v. State, 228 Ga. 107, 184 S.E.2d 179 (1971); Addison v. State, 124 Ga. App. 467, 184 S.E.2d 186 (1971); Summerour v. State, 124 Ga. App. 484, 184 S.E.2d 365 (1971); Witt v. State, 124 Ga. App. 535, 184 S.E.2d 517 (1971); Garrett v. State, 126 Ga. App. 83, 189 S.E.2d 860 (1972); Rowell v. State, 128 Ga. App. 138, 195 S.E.2d 790 (1973); Parks v. State, 230 Ga. 157, 195 S.E.2d 911 (1973); Owens v. State, 130 Ga. App. 25, 202 S.E.2d 211 (1973); Powell v. State, 130 Ga. App. 588, 203 S.E.2d 893 (1974); Elsasser v. State, 132 Ga. App. 868, 209 S.E.2d 686 (1974); Davis v. State, 233 Ga. 638, 212 S.E.2d 814 (1975); Barker v. State, 233 Ga. 781, 213 S.E.2d 624 (1975); Chappell v. State, 134 Ga. App. 375, 214 S.E.2d 392 (1975); Parks v. State, 234 Ga. 579, 216 S.E.2d 804 (1975); Jones v. State, 234 Ga. 648, 217 S.E.2d 597 (1975); Ray v. State, 235 Ga. 467, 219 S.E.2d 761 (1975); Tennon v. State, 235 Ga. 594, 220 S.E.2d 914 (1975); Whitley v. State, 137 Ga. App. 245, 223 S.E.2d 279 (1976); Baker v. State, 236 Ga. 754, 225 S.E.2d 269 (1976); Jones v. State, 138 Ga. App. 828, 227 S.E.2d 519 (1976); Robertson v. State, 140 Ga. App. 506, 231 S.E.2d 367 (1976); Price v. State, 141 Ga. App. 335, 233 S.E.2d 462 (1977); Torley v. State, 141 Ga. App. 366, 233 S.E.2d 476 (1977); Hixson v. State, 239 Ga. 134, 236 S.E.2d 78 (1977); Prince v. State, 142 Ga. App. 734, 236 S.E.2d 918 (1977); Smith v. State, 142 Ga. App. 810, 237 S.E.2d 216 (1977); Buckner v. State, 239 Ga. 838, 239 S.E.2d 22 (1977); Braxton v. State, 240 Ga. 10, 239 S.E.2d 339 (1977); Maloof v. State, 145 Ga. App. 408, 243 S.E.2d 634 (1978); Reid v. State, 145 Ga. App. 302, 243 S.E.2d 700 (1978); Morrison v. State, 147 Ga. App. 410, 249 S.E.2d 131 (1978); Wilson v. State, 147 Ga. App. 560, 249 S.E.2d 361 (1978); Newsome v. State, 149 Ga. App. 415, 254 S.E.2d 381 (1979); State v. Allen, 243 Ga. 508, 256 S.E.2d 381 (1979); Cross v. State, 150 Ga. App. 206, 257 S.E.2d 330 (1979); Ballard v. State, 150 Ga. App. 704, 258 S.E.2d 331 (1979); Simpson v. State, 150 Ga. App. 84, 258 S.E.2d 634 (1979); Spradlin v. State, 151 Ga. App. 585, 260 S.E.2d 517 (1979), overruled on other grounds, Stewart v. State, 262 Ga. App. 426, 585 S.E.2d 622 (2003); Futch v. State, 151 Ga. App. 519, 260 S.E.2d 520 (1979); Boling v. State, 244 Ga. 825, 262 S.E.2d 123 (1979); Phelps v. State, 245 Ga. 338, 265 S.E.2d 53 (1980); Arnett v. State, 245 Ga. 470, 265 S.E.2d 771 (1980); Dean v. State, 245 Ga. 503, 265 S.E.2d 805 (1980); Henderson v. State, 53 Ga. App. 801, 266 S.E.2d 522 (1980); Head v. State, 246 Ga. 360, 271 S.E.2d 452 (1980); Horne v. State, 155 Ga. App. 851, 273 S.E.2d 193 (1980); Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1980); Truitt v. State, 158 Ga. App. 337, 280 S.E.2d 384 (1981); Stewart v. State, 158 Ga. App. 378, 280 S.E.2d 403 (1981); Cervi v. State, 248 Ga. 325, 282 S.E.2d 629 (1981); Martin v. State, 159 Ga. App. 31, 282 S.E.2d 656 (1981); Nutt v. State, 159 Ga. App. 46, 282 S.E.2d 696 (1981); McCorquodale v. Balkcom, 525 F. Supp. 408 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Neal v. State, 160 Ga. App. 498, 287 S.E.2d 399 (1981); Williams v. State, 249 Ga. 6, 287 S.E.2d 31 (1982); Billings v. State, 161 Ga. App. 500, 288 S.E.2d 622 (1982); Donaldson v. State, 249 Ga. 186, 289 S.E.2d 242 (1982); Anderson v. State, 249 Ga. 238, 290 S.E.2d 40 (1982); Green v. State, 249 Ga. 369, 290 S.E.2d 466 (1982); Perault v. State, 162 Ga. App. 294, 291 S.E.2d 122 (1982); Miller v. State, 162 Ga. App. 759, 292 S.E.2d 481 (1982); Washington v. State, 249 Ga. 728, 292 S.E.2d 836 (1982); Smith v. State, 249 Ga. 801, 294 S.E.2d 525 (1982); Stewart v. State, 163 Ga. App. 735, 295 S.E.2d 112 (1982); Williams v. State, 249 Ga. 822, 295 S.E.2d 293 (1982); Rucker v. State, 250 Ga. 371, 297 S.E.2d 481 (1982); McClain v. State, 165 Ga. App. 264, 299 S.E.2d 55 (1983); Conner v. State, 251 Ga. 113, 303 S.E.2d 266 (1983); Dollar v. State, 168 Ga. App. 726, 310 S.E.2d 236 (1983); Ward v. State, 252 Ga. 85, 311 S.E.2d 449 (1984); Wilson v. State, 171 Ga. App. 120, 318 S.E.2d 705 (1984); Keller v. State, 253 Ga. 512, 322 S.E.2d 243 (1984); Boyd v. State, 253 Ga. 515, 322 S.E.2d 256 (1984); Bennett v. State, 254 Ga. 162, 326 S.E.2d 438 (1985); Buie v. State, 254 Ga. 167, 326 S.E.2d 458 (1985); Wigfall v. State, 257 Ga. 585, 361 S.E.2d 376 (1987); Laney v. State, 184 Ga. App. 463, 361 S.E.2d 841 (1987); Binns v. State, 258 Ga. 23, 364 S.E.2d 871 (1988); Griffin v. State, 199 Ga. App. 646, 405 S.E.2d 877 (1991); Dye v. State, 202 Ga. App. 31, 413 S.E.2d 500 (1991); Nelson v. State, 262 Ga. 763, 426 S.E.2d 357 (1993); Alexander v. State, 263 Ga. 474, 435 S.E.2d 187 (1993); Powell v. State, 228 Ga. App. 56, 491 S.E.2d 135 (1997); Walker v. State, 234 Ga. App. 295, 507 S.E.2d 15 (1998); Cox v. State, 243 Ga. App. 668, 533 S.E.2d 435 (2000); Vasser v. State, 273 Ga. 747, 545 S.E.2d 906 (2001); Rhode v. State, 274 Ga. 377, 552 S.E.2d 855 (2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 925, 122 S. Ct. 2593, 153 L. Ed. 2d 782 (2002), cert. denied, U.S. , 123 S. Ct. 163, 154 L. Ed. 2d 62 (2002); Reddick v. State, 264 Ga. App. 487, 591 S.E.2d 392 (2003).


INTENT

WHERE DOUBT EXISTS AS TO INTENTION TO KILL, COURT SHOULD CHARGE INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER. --If there is any evidence to raise doubt, even though slight, as to intention to kill, court should give in charge the law of involuntary manslaughter, but if there is nothing to raise such a doubt, failure to charge on that subject will not require new trial. Warnack v. State, 3 Ga. App. 590, 60 S.E. 288 (1908), later appeal, 5 Ga. App. 816, 63 S.E. 935 (1909) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, ***167;***167; 65, 67). Warnack v. State, 7 Ga. App. 73, 66 S.E. 393 (1909); Hilburn v. State, 57 Ga. App. 854, 197 S.E. 73 (1938), later appeal (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

COURT SHOULD CHARGE ON BOTH MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER WHEN THERE IS DOUBT. --Where there is evidence sufficient to raise a doubt, however slight, whether offense is murder or manslaughter, voluntary or involuntary, court should instruct jury upon these grades of manslaughter as well as murder. Ivey v. State, 42 Ga. App. 357, 156 S.E. 290 (1930) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, ***167;***167; 65, 67); Goldsmith v. State, 54 Ga. App. 268, 187 S.E. 694 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

ONE INTENTIONALLY SHOOTING ANOTHER IN SELF-DEFENSE. --Defendant who causes death of another person by intentional firing of gun, allegedly in self-defense, cannot then claim that death was unintentional. Mullins v. State, 157 Ga. App. 204, 276 S.E.2d 877 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Bangs v. State, 198 Ga. App. 404, 401 S.E.2d 599 (1991).
It is not error to refuse a request to charge lawful act -- unlawful manner -- involuntary manslaughter under former Code 1933, ***167; 26-1103 (see O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-3(b)) where defendant asserts that he or she acted in self-defense by use of a pistol, rifle, or shotgun. One who causes death of another human being by use of a gun allegedly in self-defense will not be heard to assert that although he or she used excessive force, death was not intended and act was lawful. Farmer v. State, 246 Ga. 253, 271 S.E.2d 166 (1980).
It is not necessary to give request to charge law as to involuntary manslaughter, where defendant asserts that he or she fired a gun in self-defense. Crawford v. State, 245 Ga. 89, 263 S.E.2d 131 (1980); Colbert v. State, 250 Ga. 126, 296 S.E.2d 588 (1982).
One who causes death of another by use of gun, allegedly in self-defense, will not be heard to assert that, although he or she used excessive force, death was not intended and act was lawful. Appleby v. State, 247 Ga. 587, 278 S.E.2d 366 (1981).

PRESUMPTION OF MALICE MAY ARISE FROM RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR HUMAN LIFE. --A wanton and reckless state of mind is sometimes equivalent of specific intent to kill, and such state of mind may be treated by jury as amounting to such intention when willful and intentional performance of an act is productive of violence resulting in destruction of human life. Biegun v. State, 206 Ga. 618, 58 S.E.2d 149 (1950) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

DEADLY CHARACTER AND MANNER IN WHICH WEAPON IS USED IS NOT CONCLUSIVE of intent to kill, but is only illustrative of such intent, and where from any circumstance there is doubt of accused's intention to kill, trial court must not exclude question of such intent from consideration of jury by failure to charge lesser offenses included in charge of murder, where from evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom the jury would be authorized to find that no intention to kill existed. Jenkins v. State, 86 Ga. App. 800, 72 S.E.2d 541 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

A DEADLY WEAPON MAY BE USED SO AS NOT TO RAISE PRESUMPTION OF MALICE, but to leave intent as question of fact for jury. Thus, to strike one with barrel of a pistol, instead of shooting the victim with the weapon, or to strike with handle of a dirk, instead of with the blade, would not be the ordinary way of using such weapon to kill, and the intention to kill would be a question of fact rather than of presumption. Huntsinger v. State, 200 Ga. 127, 36 S.E.2d 92 (1945) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

WHERE GUN IS FIRED DELIBERATELY AND DEATH RESULTS, court may refuse to charge involuntary manslaughter. Benford v. State, 158 Ga. App. 43, 279 S.E.2d 236 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Bangs v. State, 198 Ga. App. 404, 401 S.E.2d 599 (1991).

SHOOTING VICTIM NINE TIMES IN BACK. --Evidence showing victim had been shot nine times in back by defendant defies conclusion that there was no intention to cause death; such evidence authorizes jury to convict for murder or voluntary manslaughter, each of which requires intentional killing, or to acquit as self-defense, in which killing might or might be intentional, but simply does not support finding of unintentional killing. Hudson v. State, 146 Ga. App. 463, 246 S.E.2d 470 (1978).

WHERE DEFENDANT ADMITTEDLY INTENDED TO SHOOT CLOSE TO VICTIM. --In murder prosecution, court did not err in refusing to charge on involuntary manslaughter where defendant stated that defendant had intended to shoot close to victim, a 12-year-old boy who was leaning against defendant's car, but not to hit the boy. Moody v. State, 244 Ga. 247, 260 S.E.2d 11 (1979).

WHERE SEVENTY-FIVE KNIFE WOUNDS WERE INFLICTED UPON VICTIM. --Seventy-five knife wounds inflicted leaves no doubt on question of intent or voluntariness and failure of trial court to charge involuntary manslaughter was warranted. Anderson v. State, 248 Ga. 682, 285 S.E.2d 533 (1982).


CAUSATION

INDEPENDENT, INTERVENING, UNFORESEEABLE CAUSE OF DEATH. --In every case of involuntary manslaughter, death must be due to unlawful act of defendant, and not to intervening act or negligence of a third person; or to an independent intervening cause in which defendant did not participate and which defendant could not foresee, and death must have been the natural and probable consequence of such unlawful act and the act the proximate cause. Fair v. State, 171 Ga. 112, 155 S.E. 329 (1930) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, ***167;***167; 65, 67); Thomas v. State, 91 Ga. App. 382, 85 S.E.2d 644 (1955) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

WOUND LEAVING VICTIM MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO DISEASE OR OTHER INTERVENING AGENCIES. --Where one commits a battery upon another, or inflicts a wound, which battery or wound is not likely in itself to produce death, but which renders the other person more susceptible to disease, or leaves the other person at mercy of elements or some other intervening agency, which brings about the person's death, the original wounding or battery of deceased is in a legal sense the cause of death. Wyrick v. State, 96 Ga. App. 847, 102 S.E.2d 53 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

DEATH FROM COMBINED EFFECTS OF INJURY AND DISEASE ATTRIBUTED TO FORMER. --If deceased was in feeble health and died from combined effects of injury and of disease, the person who inflicted injury is liable, although injury alone would not have been fatal. Wells v. State, 46 Ga. App. 412, 167 S.E. 709 (1933) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, ***167;***167; 65, 67).

ONE INFLICTING INJURY WHICH ACCELERATES DEATH FROM DISEASE. --If deceased was in feeble health and injury inflicted accelerated death from disease, even if disease itself would probably have been fatal, he who inflicted injury is liable, although injury alone would not have been fatal. Wells v. State, 46 Ga. App. 412, 167 S.E. 709 (1933).

DEATH RESULTING FROM INJURIES SUSTAINED IN ESCAPING ASSAULT. --Where one perpetrates an assault upon another, and the other, in an effort to escape, runs into a place of danger, and there sustains injuries which result in death, in a legal sense, death resulted from assault, though such assault taken by itself would not likely have produced death. Wyrick v. State, 96 Ga. App. 847, 102 S.E.2d 53 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).


UNLAWFUL ACT INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER in commission of an unlawful act are, first, intentional commission of an unlawful act, and, second, killing of a human being without having so intended, but as proximate result of such intended act. Wells v. State, 44 Ga. App. 760, 162 S.E. 835 (1932) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, ***167;***167; 65, 67); Passley v. State, 62 Ga. App. 88, 8 S.E.2d 131 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009); Williams v. State, 96 Ga. App. 833, 101 S.E.2d 747 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009); Thacker v. State, 103 Ga. App. 36, 117 S.E.2d 913 (1961) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009); Bond v. State, 104 Ga. App. 627, 122 S.E.2d 310 (1961) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER IN COMMISSION OF UNLAWFUL ACT are, first, intent to commit unlawful act, and secondly, killing of human being without having so intended, but as proximate result of such intended unlawful act. Paulhill v. State, 229 Ga. 415, 191 S.E.2d 842 (1972).

AN UNLAWFUL ACT WITHIN MEANING OF SECTION IS AN ACT PROHIBITED BY LAW; that is to say, an act condemned by some statute or valid municipal ordinance of this state. Silver v. State, 13 Ga. App. 722, 79 S.E. 919 (1913) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, ***167;***167; 65, 67); Perry v. State, 78 Ga. App. 273, 50 S.E.2d 709 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009); Walters v. State, 90 Ga. App. 360, 83 S.E.2d 48 (1954) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

UNLAWFUL ACT INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER CAN STEM FROM ACTS MALUM PROHIBITUM OR ACTS MALUM IN SE. Silver v. State, 13 Ga. App. 722, 79 S.E. 919 (1913) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, ***167;***167; 65, 67); Perry v. State, 78 Ga. App. 273, 50 S.E.2d 709 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER IN COMMISSION OF AN UNLAWFUL ACT IS NOT A REDUCIBLE FELONY. Hardrick v. State, 96 Ga. App. 670, 101 S.E.2d 99 (1957) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).
To be entitled to a charge on involuntary manslaughter under O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-3, the evidence had to support the conclusion that the killing resulted unintentionally from an unlawful act other than a felony. Oliver v. State, 274 Ga. 539, 554 S.E.2d 474 (2001).

IN DEFINING INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER, COURT SHOULD GIVE RULES. --In defining involuntary manslaughter it is error for court to fail to give in charge to jury, even without request, rules of law applicable in determining what is an unlawful act. Pope v. State, 52 Ga. App. 411, 183 S.E. 630 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

UNLAWFUL ACT INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER REQUIRES INTENTIONAL COMMISSION OF UNLAWFUL ACT. Solomon v. State, 113 Ga. App. 116, 147 S.E.2d 467 (1966) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

WHEN INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER MAY BE ESTABLISHED BY UNLAWFUL ACT COMMITTED UNINTENTIONALLY. --Involuntary manslaughter may be proved by evidence showing that an unlawful act was committed unintentionally, but as a result of conduct so reckless that it imports a thoughtless disregard for consequences or indifference to safety to others and reasonable foresight that death or bodily harm will result. Solomon v. State, 113 Ga. App. 116, 147 S.E.2d 467 (1966) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

SUBSECTION (A) CONSTRUED. --O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-3 (a) is properly not charged where defendant's action would constitute felony (assault with a deadly weapon). Lancaster v. State, 250 Ga. 871, 301 S.E.2d 882 (1983); Smith v. State, 253 Ga. 476, 322 S.E.2d 58 (1984).
Unlawful act referred to in former Code 1933, ***167; 26-1103 (see O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-3(a)) was act of person committing manslaughter, not act of victim. McManus v. State, 130 Ga. App. 840, 204 S.E.2d 813 (1974).
Former Code 1933, ***167; 26-1103 (see O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-3(a)) requires that unlawful act be cause in fact of victim's death. Burns v. State, 240 Ga. 827, 242 S.E.2d 579 (1978).

INTENTIONALLY POINTING A PISTOL AT ANOTHER IN FUN OR OTHERWISE. --Intentionally to point a pistol at another, in fun or otherwise, save in instances excepted by statute, is unlawful; and if, while performing such unlawful act, the pistol is accidentally discharged, the person so acting, if not guilty of murder, would be guilty of involuntary manslaughter in commission of an unlawful act. Delegal v. State, 92 Ga. App. 744, 90 S.E.2d 32 (1955) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).
Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction where testimony showed that the defendant, a minor, was unlawfully in possession of a handgun which defendant had cocked and recklessly pointed at another causing that person's death. Smith v. State, 234 Ga. App. 314, 506 S.E.2d 659 (1998).
Intentionally to point a pistol or gun at another, not intending to shoot is unlawful, and if it is accidentally discharged, crime would be involuntary manslaughter. Leonard v. State, 133 Ga. 435, 66 S.E. 251 (1909) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, ***167;***167; 65, 67); Baker v. State, 12 Ga. App. 553, 77 S.E. 884 (1913) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, ***167;***167; 65, 67).

CARRYING OF A CONCEALED WEAPON was not an "unlawful act other than a felony" that justified a charge on felony involuntary manslaughter in a prosecution for voluntary manslaughter; the concealment, while unlawful, did not cause the death, defendant's firing of the gun did so. Carlton v. State, 224 Ga. App. 315, 480 S.E.2d 336 (1997).

ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE OF PISTOL KILLING BYSTANDER. --Assault upon officer, causing accidental discharge of the officer's pistol, thereby killing bystander constitutes involuntary manslaughter. Grey v. State, 126 Ga. App. 357, 190 S.E.2d 557 (1972).

THE DEATH OF A CHILD RESULTING FROM A NEGLIGENT OMISSION TO COMPLY WITH THE PARENTAL DUTY stated in O.C.G.A. ***167; 19-7-2 would amount to involuntary manslaughter by the commission of an unlawful act. Lewis v. State, 180 Ga. App. 369, 349 S.E.2d 257 (1986).

LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF MURDER. --A rational trier of fact could reasonably have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder. Under such circumstances, the jury was certainly authorized to find defendant guilty of felony-grade involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense. Thomas v. State, 183 Ga. App. 819, 360 S.E.2d 75 (1987).

IN HOMICIDE TRIAL, DEFENDANT'S ACT WAS CLEARLY FELONY OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, not the misdemeanor of pointing a weapon at another, where the testimony showed that victim, as well as the three passengers in the victim's car, were aware of and understandably apprehensive of immediate violent injury, and defendant's own testimony ("I was showing the gun to him so he would leave me alone.") revealed that defendant's purpose in pointing the weapon was to place the victim in apprehension of immediate violent injury, and the request for a charge on misdemeanor manslaughter was properly denied. Rhodes v. State, 257 Ga. 368, 359 S.E.2d 670 (1987); Rameau v. State, 267 Ga. 261, 477 S.E.2d 118 (1996).
Because the unlawful use of a knife, a deadly weapon, while repeatedly stabbing the victim constituted the felony of aggravated assault, a charge on involuntary manslaughter would have been improper. Harris v. State, 257 Ga. 385, 359 S.E.2d 675 (1987).
The defendant was, at the very least, engaged in the commission of an aggravated assault, when defendant pointed the gun at the victim and the gun fired, since aggravated assault is a felony, the trial court did not err by refusing to charge on felony involuntary manslaughter. Brooks v. State, 262 Ga. 187, 415 S.E.2d 903 (1992).

DRIVING UNDER INFLUENCE OF WHISKEY ON WRONG SIDE OF ROAD supports conviction of involuntary manslaughter in commission of unlawful act. Tillman v. State, 61 Ga. App. 724, 7 S.E.2d 285 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

UNDERLYING MISDEMEANOR OF RECKLESS CONDUCT. --An indictment against a defendant is not defective where the felony of involuntary manslaughter is based on an underlying misdemeanor of reckless conduct. Turnipseed v. State, 186 Ga. App. 278, 367 S.E.2d 259 (1988).

EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT. --In a prosecution for malice murder, where the jury was not authorized by the evidence to find that the death occurred as a result of an unlawful act other than a felony, the trial court correctly refused to give a charge on involuntary manslaughter. Smith v. State, 267 Ga. 838, 483 S.E.2d 589 (1997).


LAWFUL ACT -- UNLAWFUL MANNER INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE OF INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER IN COMMISSION OF A LAWFUL ACT, are: (1) killing of a human being, (2) without any intention to do so, (3) in commission of a lawful act, (4) which might probably produce death, and (5) in a manner not justified by law. Roughlin v. State, 17 Ga. App. 205, 86 S.E. 452 (1915) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, ***167;***167; 65, 67).

IN DEFINING LAWFUL ACT -- UNLAWFUL MANNER INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER, IT IS BEST TO ADDRESS CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE. --In absence of timely written request for broader instruction, it is sufficient to define offense of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of a lawful act without due caution and circumspection in language of section, although it is better to charge that it must result from criminal negligence, which is something more than ordinary negligence which would authorize a recovery in a civil action. Jordan v. State, 103 Ga. App. 493, 120 S.E.2d 30 (1961) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

TO RENDER LAWFUL ACT CARELESSLY PERFORMED, RESULTING IN DEATH CRIMINAL, carelessness must have been gross, implying indifference to consequences. Collins v. State, 66 Ga. App. 325, 18 S.E.2d 24 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

LAWFUL ACT -- UNLAWFUL MANNER INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER NEED NOT BE CHARGED ABSENT REQUEST. --There was no error in failing to charge on involuntary manslaughter by committing a lawful act in an unlawful manner where there was no request for such charge. Hart v. State, 157 Ga. App. 716, 278 S.E.2d 419 (1981).

USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE IN SELF DEFENSE AS INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER. --Self-defense is a lawful act which can be performed in an unlawful manner should jury conclude that more force was utilized than necessary. Hodge v. State, 153 Ga. App. 553, 265 S.E.2d 878 (1980), overruled on other grounds, Bangs v. State, 198 Ga. App. 404, 401 S.E.2d 599 (1991).
Where there is issue of excessive force in act of self-defense and denial of intent to kill, a jury is authorized to find that death was caused unintentionally by commission of a lawful act (self-defense) in an unlawful manner (use of excessive force). Mullins v. State, 157 Ga. App. 204, 276 S.E.2d 877 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Bangs v. State, 198 Ga. App. 404, 401 S.E.2d 599 (1991).
O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-3(b) is applicable when evidence would authorize jury to find that defendant caused death unintentionally while acting in self-defense but that defendant used excessive force. Facison v. State, 152 Ga. App. 645, 263 S.E.2d 523 (1979).
Where force used exceeds that necessary for self-defense, the law will consider defender the aggressor and if the defender's act results in a homicide, the offense is at least manslaughter. Spradlin v. State, 151 Ga. App. 585, 260 S.E.2d 517 (1979), overruled on other grounds, Stewart v. State, 262 Ga. App. 426, 585 S.E.2d 622 (2003), overruled on other grounds, Bangs v. State, 198 Ga. App. 404, 401 S.E.2d 599 (1991).

CLEARLY RECKLESS CONDUCT. --Since defendant's act of repeatedly striking a child over 100 times with a belt was so clearly reckless conduct that it could not qualify as a lawful act, the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter. Paul v. State, 274 Ga. 601, 555 S.E.2d 716 (2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 828, 123 S. Ct. 123, 154 L. Ed. 2d 41 (2002).

INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER BASED ON USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE IS INAPPLICABLE WHERE DEFENDANT USED GUN. --Although defendant who uses gun in self-defense is entitled to charge on law of self-defense, defendant is not also entitled to charge on law of lawful act -- unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter on theory that force used was excessive. Appleby v. State, 247 Ga. 587, 278 S.E.2d 366 (1981).
One who causes death of another by deliberate use, as opposed to accidental discharge, of a gun, allegedly in self-defense, will not be heard to assert that, although he or she used excessive force, death was not intended and the act was lawful; since the deadly force of a gun is known to all, and it cannot be argued that the excessive force of a gun was unintentional. Benford v. State, 158 Ga. App. 43, 279 S.E.2d 236 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Bangs v. State, 198 Ga. App. 404, 401 S.E.2d 599 (1991).
It is unnecessary to give instruction as to involuntary manslaughter where defendant asserts that he or she fired gun in self-defense. Pass v. State, 160 Ga. App. 64, 286 S.E.2d 53 (1981).

USE OF GUN IN SELF-DEFENSE IN AN UNLAWFUL MANNER CONSTITUTES CRIME OF RECKLESS CONDUCT, under O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-60, and thus is not a lawful act within meaning of O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-3(b). Crawford v. State, 245 Ga. 89, 263 S.E.2d 131 (1980); Farmer v. State, 246 Ga. 253, 271 S.E.2d 166 (1980); Appleby v. State, 247 Ga. 587, 278 S.E.2d 366 (1981); Pass v. State, 160 Ga. App. 64, 286 S.E.2d 53 (1981).

ALTHOUGH EXCESSIVE FORCE BY USE OF GUN IN SELF-DEFENSE WILL NOT AUTHORIZE O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-3(B) CHARGE, EXCESSIVE FORCE BY USE OF KNIFE MAY; it can be error not to charge on O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-3(b) where a knife was used in self-defense. Lancaster v. State, 250 Ga. 871, 301 S.E.2d 882 (1983).

EFFECT OF MANSLAUGHTER CONVICTION WHERE CHARGE REQUESTED AND EVIDENCE SUPPORTED MURDER CONVICTION. --Where there is evidence which supports a verdict of guilty of the more serious offense of murder, and there is slight evidence of the lesser included offense of manslaughter, the appellant, who requested a charge on and was convicted of the lesser offense, may not successfully urge that the evidence was insufficient. Vick v. State, 166 Ga. App. 572, 305 S.E.2d 17 (1983).


CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE

ELEMENT DIFFERENTIATING LOWEST GRADE OF INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER FROM NONCRIMINAL KILLING is that in former, negligence must be more than ordinary negligence which would be sufficient to authorize recovery in civil action, and must go to extent of being gross or culpable negligence, whereas in latter there is absence of culpable negligence in performance of lawful act which resulted in death of human being. Collins v. State, 66 Ga. App. 325, 18 S.E.2d 24 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

MERE NEGLIGENT KILLING, WITHOUT MORE, MAY NOT AMOUNT TO MURDER. Patterson v. State, 181 Ga. 698, 184 S.E. 309 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

NEGLIGENCE WHICH WILL RENDER UNINTENTIONAL HOMICIDE CRIMINAL is such carelessness or recklessness as is incompatible with a proper regard for human life. An act of omission, as well as commission, may be so criminal as to render death resulting therefrom manslaughter; but the omission must be one likely to cause death. Foy v. State, 40 Ga. App. 617, 150 S.E. 917 (1929) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, ***167;***167; 65, 67).

CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE IMPLIES KNOWLEDGE OF WILLFUL OR WANTON DISREGARD OF PROBABLE EFFECTS. --Criminal negligence necessarily implies not only knowledge of probable consequences which may result from use of a given instrumentality, but also willful or wanton disregard of probable effects of such instrumentality upon others likely to be affected thereby. Consequently, criminal negligence is not shown as against a defendant who uses every means in the defendant's power for the safety of those whom it is alleged defendant's negligence has affected. Foy v. State, 40 Ga. App. 617, 150 S.E. 917 (1929) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, ***167;***167; 65, 67); Thomas v. State, 91 Ga. App. 382, 85 S.E.2d 644 (1955) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE MUST BE SUCH AS SHOWS AN INDIFFERENCE TO INJURIOUS RESULTS of negligent acts and must be inconsiderate of others. In order for one to be held to have been indifferent to the safety of others or inconsiderate of their welfare, it must appear that the person knew, or that an ordinarily prudent person under similar circumstances would have known, that the person's act would probably endanger others. It seems obvious that, for an act thus to appear dangerous, there must of necessity be some commonly recognized danger inherent in it. The instrumentality in connection with which there is negligence must be of a kind that is dangerous because of the manner in which it is handled. Geele v. State, 203 Ga. 369, 47 S.E.2d 283 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

NEGLIGENCE NECESSARY TO CONSTITUTE CRIME IS EQUIVALENT OF AND, IN FACT, IS RECKLESSNESS. Geele v. State, 203 Ga. 369, 47 S.E.2d 283 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).


INDICTMENT

INDICTMENT DEFECTIVE. --State failed to allege that defendant committed an unlawful act which under any circumstances could be the proximate cause of the unintentional death, thus defendant's general demurrer should have been granted. Scraders v. State, 263 Ga. App. 754, 589 S.E.2d 315 (2003).


JURY INSTRUCTIONS

CHARGE SHOULD COVER INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER WHERE THERE IS DOUBT AS TO INTENTION. --Where evidence and statement, taken together or separately, raise doubt, although slight, as to intention to kill, law of involuntary manslaughter should be given in charge. Kerbo v. State, 230 Ga. 241, 196 S.E.2d 424 (1973).

CHARGE ON INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER UNWARRANTED WHERE KILLING WAS INTENTIONAL. --Charge on involuntary manslaughter is not warranted where evidence establishes without conflict that killing was intentional rather than unintentional. Bullock v. State, 150 Ga. App. 824, 258 S.E.2d 610 (1979); Ward v. State, 151 Ga. App. 36, 258 S.E.2d 699 (1979); Ward v. State, 153 Ga. App. 743, 266 S.E.2d 556 (1980).
Because defendant conceded that defendant shot at the victims intentionally, albeit in self defense, a charge on the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter, which requires a lack of intent, was not warranted. Harris v. State, 272 Ga. 455, 532 S.E.2d 76 (2000).

WHERE JURY AUTHORIZED TO FIND ONLY INTENTIONAL POINTING OF PISTOL, CHARGE ON INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER REQUIRED. --Where from testimony jury would have been authorized to find only an intentional pointing of pistol, a misdemeanor, justifying a conviction of involuntary manslaughter in commission of unlawful act other than a felony, it was error not to charge jury on involuntary manslaughter. Kerbo v. State, 230 Ga. 241, 196 S.E.2d 424 (1973).

CHARGE ON INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER NOT REQUIRED WHERE DEFENDANT TESTIFIES VICTIM STRUCK FIRST BLOW. --While charge of involuntary manslaughter in commission of unlawful act might be required if defendant were guilty of a simple assault, such a charge is not required where defendant testifies that victim struck first blow by knocking defendant down. McManus v. State, 130 Ga. App. 840, 204 S.E.2d 813 (1974).

FELONIOUS INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER DOES NOT INVOKE FELONY-MURDER RULE. --Voluntary manslaughter, and felony of involuntary manslaughter where it applies, are not themselves felonies which will invoke felony-murder rule as to death of main victim. Therefore, if jury finds felonious manslaughter, it should not go on to reason that this offense, being itself a felony, turns killing into a felony murder. The jury should be instructed in accordance with this principle. Malone v. State, 238 Ga. 251, 232 S.E.2d 907 (1977).

FELONY OR MISDEMEANOR STATUS, NOT JURY CONSIDERATION. --Even though the jurors indicated they would not have voted defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter had they known it was punishable as a felony, the legal status of the crime (felony or misdemeanor) and the resulting punishment when a guilty verdict is returned, is of absolutely no concern to the jury. The juror's testimony clearly showed correct application of law to facts, so even if the charge confused the jury and was thus error despite being a correct statement of the law, any such error was harmless. Howard v. State, 213 Ga. App. 542, 445 S.E.2d 532 (1994).

JURY INSTRUCTION PROPERLY DEFINING CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE. --The court did not err in charging that "if you find that the death of the child occurred as a result of negligent omission of the defendant, then this negligent omission would be involuntary manslaughter by an unlawful act," where the court charged that, in order for the accused to be found guilty of any crime, the jury must determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged criminal act or omission was committed with criminal intent or criminal negligence, and properly defined criminal negligence as "reckless conduct such as shows an indifference to the injurious results of a negligent act, and indifference to the safety of others, and a lack of consideration for their welfare." Lewis v. State, 180 Ga. App. 369, 349 S.E.2d 257 (1986).

CHARGE ON UNLAWFUL ACT INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER UPHELD WHERE NO REASONABLE VIEW WOULD SUPPORT CONTRARY FINDING. --Where the court did not instruct on involuntary manslaughter in the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner, a misdemeanor, but instructed only on involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act, a felony, and no reasonable view of the evidence would have authorized a finding that the death resulted from the commission of a lawful act, the charge was not defective. Lewis v. State, 180 Ga. App. 369, 349 S.E.2d 257 (1986).

CHARGE ON O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-3(B) UNWARRANTED WHERE KILLING RESULTS FROM UNLAWFUL ACT. --Where killing decedent, even if unintended, was done as incident to unlawful, criminally negligent act of brandishing knife at others, failure to charge provisions of former Code 1933, ***167; 26-1103 (see O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-3(b)) was not error. Keye v. State, 136 Ga. App. 707, 222 S.E.2d 172 (1975).
Where firing pistol was not lawful, defendant is not entitled to charge of former Code 1933, ***167; 26-1103 (see O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-3(b)). Truitt v. State, 156 Ga. App. 156, 274 S.E.2d 42 (1980).
Evidence adduced at trial did not reflect that defendant's use of a gun amounted to reckless conduct or any other misdemeanor, and although the trial court properly charged the jury on self-defense and accident, it did not err by refusing to charge the jury on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder. Brown v. State, 277 Ga. 53, 586 S.E.2d 323 (2003).
Requested jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter was properly denied where defendant's conduct in producing and displaying a loaded revolver in close proximity to his girlfriend, who allegedly was under the influence of drugs, and her young child, with his finger inside the trigger guard while he was watching the road and trying to drive, constituted the crime of crime of reckless conduct under O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-60(b). Reed v. State, 279 Ga. 81, 610 S.E.2d 35 (2005).

CHARGE WHERE EVIDENCE AUTHORIZES FINDING OF EXCESSIVE FORCE IN SELF-DEFENSE. --Trial court charged jury on law of self-defense and evidence would have authorized jury to find that defendant caused death of another unintentionally while acting in self-defense, a lawful act, but that defendant used excessive force, in unlawful manner; trial court erred in failing to charge jury on involuntary manslaughter, since charge on self-defense left open issue of application of involuntary manslaughter under former Code 1933, ***167; 26-1103 (see O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-3(b)). Allen v. State, 147 Ga. App. 701, 250 S.E.2d 5 (1978).
Defendant is entitled to instruction on involuntary manslaughter when such instruction is timely requested and when there is evidence that homicide was caused by use of excessive force in self-defense. Jackson v. State, 143 Ga. App. 734, 240 S.E.2d 180 (1977), overruled on other grounds, Bangs v. State, 198 Ga. App. 404, 401 S.E.2d 599 (1991).

CHARGE ON O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-3(B) NOT REQUIRED. --The evidence does not require a charge of involuntary manslaughter for the commission of a "lawful act" in an "unlawful manner," that is, self-defense (lawful act) with use of excessive force (unlawful manner), where the defendant confronted the victim with a hidden, extremely long knife, the deadly force of which is known to all. Fitzhugh v. State, 166 Ga. App. 320, 304 S.E.2d 127 (1983).
A defendant is not entitled to an instruction on involuntary manslaughter in a prosecution for felony-murder where the defendant bases the defense upon a claim of justification and the court charges the jury as to self defense and accident. Willis v. State, 258 Ga. 477, 371 S.E.2d 376 (1988); Lee v. State, 259 Ga. 230, 378 S.E.2d 855 (1989); Clark v. State, 271 Ga. 27, 518 S.E.2d 117 (1999).

CHARGE ON O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-3(B) UNWARRANTED WHERE AGGRAVATED ASSAULT COMMITTED. --Where a person deliberately gets a gun and brandishes it at another in order to scare the other, thus committing an aggravated assault, such circumstances do not give rise to a charge on lawful act -- unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter. Brown v. State, 166 Ga. App. 765, 305 S.E.2d 386 (1983).

INSTRUCTION ON INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER UNWARRANTED WHERE SELF-DEFENSE ASSERTED. --Defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the law of involuntary manslaughter where defendant asserted that defendant was attacked by the victim and drew the gun and fired in self-defense. Smith v. State, 251 Ga. 229, 304 S.E.2d 716 (1983); Johnson v. State, 259 Ga. 235, 378 S.E.2d 859 (1989).
A defendant who seeks to justify homicide under the "self-defense" statute, O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-3-21, is not entitled to an additional instruction on involuntary manslaughter in the course of a lawful act, whatever the implement of death. For if defendant is justified in killing under O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-3-21, defendant is guilty of no crime at all. If defendant is not so justified, the homicide does not fall within the "lawful act" predicate of O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-3(b), for the jury, in rejecting defendant's claim of justification, has of necessity determined thereby that the act is not lawful. Saylors v. State, 251 Ga. 735, 309 S.E.2d 796 (1983); Moore v. State, 177 Ga. App. 569, 340 S.E.2d 222 (1986); Mims v. State, 180 Ga. App. 3, 348 S.E.2d 498 (1986); Stewart v. State, 182 Ga. App. 576, 356 S.E.2d 535 (1987); Thompson v. State, 257 Ga. 481, 361 S.E.2d 154 (1987); Kennedy v. State, 193 Ga. App. 784, 389 S.E.2d 350, cert. denied, 193 Ga. App. 910, 389 S.E.2d 350 (1989); Nobles v. State, 201 Ga. App. 483, 411 S.E.2d 294, cert. denied, 201 Ga. App. 904, 411 S.E.2d 294 (1991).
The defendant in a murder trial who argued that actions were lawful in defending self with an ax but did so in an unlawful manner, in that the force used was excessive, and who received a self-defense instruction, was not entitled to an additional charge on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner. Jordan v. State, 171 Ga. App. 558, 320 S.E.2d 395 (1984).
Trial court did not err in failing to charge on involuntary manslaughter in the course of a lawful act, where the defense was based upon self-defense, which was fully charged to the jury. King v. State, 177 Ga. App. 788, 341 S.E.2d 307 (1986).
Although the defendant who uses a gun in self-defense is entitled to a charge on the law of self-defense, that defendant is not also entitled to a charge on the law of lawful act-unlawful manner-involuntary manslaughter on the theory that the use of the gun was unnecessary (i.e., the force used was excessive). Pullin v. State, 257 Ga. 815, 364 S.E.2d 848 (1988); Reid v. State, 206 Ga. App. 367, 425 S.E.2d 315 (1992).
A charge on involuntary manslaughter is not required where the defendant asserts using a gun in self-defense. Lamon v. State, 260 Ga. 119, 390 S.E.2d 582 (1990).
Trial court acted properly in not giving the jury a requested instruction on involuntary manslaughter in the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner, pursuant to O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-3(b), because defendant asserted self-defense in the fatal shooting of the victim and the jury was instructed on the issues of self-defense and accident. Mize v. State, 277 Ga. 148, 586 S.E.2d 648 (2003).

FAILURE TO CHARGE JURY WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL. --The failure to charge the jury on involuntary manslaughter in the commission of a lawful act was not so blatantly apparent and prejudicial that it raised a question whether defendant was deprived of a fair trial because of it, especially where the evidence adduced by the state authorized the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of voluntary manslaughter, the offense upon which the jury was instructed under the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). Chambers v. State, 205 Ga. App. 16, 421 S.E.2d 88, cert. denied, 205 Ga. App. 899, 421 S.E.2d 88 (1992).

WHERE STATE'S EVIDENCE RAISES ISSUE OF MANSLAUGHTER COURT SHOULD CHARGE THEREON, EVEN WITHOUT REQUEST. --Where jury can find from state's evidence that accused unintentionally killed deceased in commission of an unlawful act, or without due caution and circumspection during a lawful act resulting in culpable negligence, the state's evidence places lesser crime of manslaughter in the case and requires charge thereon without request. Drake v. State, 221 Ga. 347, 144 S.E.2d 519 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

WHERE ACT MAY OR MAY NOT BE LAWFUL, BOTH GRADES SHOULD BE CHARGED. --Where act from which death results may or may not be lawful under facts, both grades of law of involuntary manslaughter should be given in charge. Warnack v. State, 3 Ga. App. 590, 60 S.E. 288 (1908), later appeal, 5 Ga. App. 816, 63 S.E. 935; 7 Ga. App. 73, 66 S.E. 393 (1909) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, ***167;***167; 65, 67).

COURT MAY CHARGE ON BOTH ACCIDENT AND INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER. --Despite fact that defenses of accident and involuntary manslaughter may be inconsistent, since jury, upon finding presence of one, would be precluded from finding the other, a court may properly charge on both theories of law. Benford v. State, 158 Ga. App. 43, 279 S.E.2d 236 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Bangs v. State, 198 Ga. App. 404, 401 S.E.2d 599 (1991).

CHARGE ON MANSLAUGHTER NOT MISLEADING WHERE EVIDENCE AUTHORIZES FINDING OF MISTAKE. --It is not misleading to charge on voluntary manslaughter in a case where the jury might be authorized to find that defendant shot deceased by mistake, intending to shoot a person making an assault on the defendant. Sinkfield v. State, 222 Ga. 51, 148 S.E.2d 409 (1966) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

FAILURE TO CHARGE ON MANSLAUGHTER NOT ERRONEOUS. --In a prosecution for felony murder, defendant's "catchall" request to charge on "murder, manslaughter, and aggravated assault," pursuant to the pattern charges "Part 4B (as applicable)" was not precisely adjusted to the principles of the case, and the failure to charge on manslaughter was not erroneous. Lane v. State, 268 Ga. 678, 492 S.E.2d 230 (1997).
There was sufficient evidence to convict a defendant of felony murder under O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-1 based upon his actions of participating in the attack by hitting the victim with the bat even though he did not actually shoot the victim; thus, instructions tracking O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-21(a)(2) aggravated assault could properly be based on another perpetrator's use of a gun but the victim's acts of self-defense were not provocation that justified an O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-3(a) involuntary manslaughter instruction. Ros v. State, Ga. , S.E.2d , 2005 Ga. LEXIS 530 (Sept. 19, 2005).

COURT REFUSAL TO GIVE MISDEMEANOR GRADE INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER CHARGE. --It is not error to refuse to give a requested charge on misdemeanor grade involuntary manslaughter where the defendant asserts that he or she caused the death of another by the use of a gun in self-defense. Moore v. State, 251 Ga. 499, 307 S.E.2d 476 (1983).

ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING MURDER OR VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER WERE HARMLESS where conviction was of involuntary manslaughter. McGraw v. State, 85 Ga. App. 857, 70 S.E.2d 141 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

TO WARRANT INSTRUCTIONS ON INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER evidence must authorize determination that death occurred unintentionally from commission of unlawful act other than a felony, or from commission of lawful act in unlawful manner likely to produce death or great bodily harm. Hewitt v. State, 127 Ga. App. 180, 193 S.E.2d 47 (1972); Trask v. State, 132 Ga. App. 645, 208 S.E.2d 591 (1974); Henderson v. State, 153 Ga. App. 801, 266 S.E.2d 522 (1980).
The decision to charge on involuntary manslaughter is a fact question which must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Byrer v. State, 260 Ga. 484, 397 S.E.2d 120 (1990).
To warrant instruction on involuntary manslaughter, there must be evidence to authorize a determination that death occurred unintentionally from the commission of an unlawful act other than a felony. Byrer v. State, 260 Ga. 484, 397 S.E.2d 120 (1990).

INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER SHOULD BE CHARGED, UPON REQUEST, where there is "slight evidence" to support the charge. Richardson v. State, 250 Ga. 506, 299 S.E.2d 715 (1983).

INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER CHARGE WARRANTED IN ARSON PROSECUTION. --In a prosecution for felony murder and arson, the trial court erred in refusing to grant defendant's charge on involuntary manslaughter where despite defendant's concession that defendant intentionally set the fire, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that the defendant set the fire without intending to burn down the motel building. Reinhardt v. State, 263 Ga. 113, 428 S.E.2d 333 (1993).

IF EVIDENCE AUTHORIZES FINDING OF INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER failure to charge thereon is error. Johnston v. State, 232 Ga. 268, 206 S.E.2d 468 (1974).
Where there is evidence from which jury would be authorized to find accused guilty of involuntary manslaughter in commission of a lawful act without due caution and circumspection, it is error for judge to omit to instruct jury on law relating to that grade of manslaughter. Maloof v. State, 139 Ga. App. 787, 229 S.E.2d 560 (1976).

CHARGE ON INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER UNWARRANTED. See Lancaster v. State, 250 Ga. 871, 301 S.E.2d 882 (1983); Moses v. State, 264 Ga. 313, 444 S.E.2d 767 (1994); Smith v. State, 264 Ga. 857, 452 S.E.2d 494 (1995); Grano v. State, 265 Ga. 346, 455 S.E.2d 582 (1995); Brown v. State, 269 Ga. 67, 495 S.E.2d 289 (1998).
The trial court did not err in refusing to charge on involuntary manslaughter where the defendant offered no evidence concerning intent, whereas the state offered testimony that the defendant told the victim, while defendant was beating the victim, that defendant was going to kill her, and whereas several witnesses testified that the defendant told them after the beating that the victim deserved to die. Elliott v. State, 253 Ga. 417, 320 S.E.2d 361 (1984).
Where an act that causes a death is a felony, a requested involuntary manslaughter charge is properly denied. Mayweather v. State, 254 Ga. 660, 333 S.E.2d 597 (1985); Rouse v. State, 265 Ga. 32, 453 S.E.2d 30 (1995); Smith v. State, 267 Ga. 502, 480 S.E.2d 838 (1997).
Requested charges on involuntary manslaughter, pointing a firearm at another, and simple assault, were properly refused, where defendant's testimony (that defendant fired shots with the intention of frightening a group) established as a matter of law the offense of aggravated assault, and the testimony that members of the group were frightened and dropped to the ground was inconsistent with the requested charges. Hawkins v. State, 260 Ga. 138, 390 S.E.2d 836 (1990).
A charge on involuntary manslaughter is not warranted, even if it is the sole defense, if the evidence does not support the charge. Hayes v. State, 261 Ga. 439, 405 S.E.2d 660 (1991).
There was no evidence that the defendant, who murdered the victim with a rifle, was attempting to effect a valid citizen's arrest, and, hence, defendant was not entitled to an involuntary manslaughter charge. It was not reasonable for the defendant to attempt an arrest with a semi-automatic weapon which defendant was not licensed to carry, as deadly force in effecting an arrest is limited to self-defense or to a situation in which it is necessary to prevent a forcible felony. Hayes v. State, 261 Ga. 439, 405 S.E.2d 660 (1991).
Defendant, who confessed to intentionally setting his son's bed on fire, with his five-year-old son asleep in it, was not entitled to a charge to the jury on involuntary manslaughter; arson was a felony, so involuntary manslaughter would not apply. Riley v. State, 278 Ga. 677, 604 S.E.2d 488 (2004).

COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO CHARGE BOTH KINDS OF INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER. --See Eller v. State, 183 Ga. App. 724, 360 S.E.2d 53 (1987).

NO IMPROPER SEQUENTIAL CHARGE. --Where the trial court instructed the jury on the law of malice murder and felony murder, the offenses for which defendant was indicted, and the included offense of involuntary manslaughter, the court did not give an improper sequential charge, as involuntary manslaughter does not contain an element that mitigates a greater offense. McNeal v. State, 263 Ga. 397, 435 S.E.2d 47 (1993).

JURY INSTRUCTIONS CONSIDERED AS WHOLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER MISLEADING. --Although a portion of the trial court's main charge which states that "a person convicted under subsection (a) is guilty of a misdemeanor" is inappropriate, the trial court's instructions must be considered as a whole to determine whether they would mislead a jury of ordinary intelligence. Cooper v. State, 167 Ga. App. 440, 306 S.E.2d 709 (1983).
When defendant's indictment charged that while committing possession of a firearm by a person under the age of 18 years, in violation of O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-11-32, defendant caused a victim's death without any intention to do so, the indictment was fatally defective because it was not sufficient to allege that the unintentional death was caused solely by defendant's possession of the firearm, as the state did not allege an unlawful act which under any circumstances could be the proximate cause of the unintentional death. Scraders v. State, 263 Ga. App. 754, 589 S.E.2d 315 (2003).


INDICTMENT

CONVICTION FOR MANSLAUGHTER UPON INDICTMENT CHARGING MURDER IS PROPER, although there is no count for manslaughter in the indictment. Perry v. State, 78 Ga. App. 273, 50 S.E.2d 709 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER IN COMMISSION OF UNLAWFUL ACT IS ALWAYS INCLUDED IN INDICTMENT FOR MURDER. --Indictment having been laid for murder and charging that mortal wound was inflicted by shooting deceased with a pistol and proof being that this was manner in which deceased was killed, a verdict of involuntary manslaughter would find support in the pleading, for reason that involuntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being and such crime is always included in an indictment for murder -- that is, the indictment necessarily included within itself all essential ingredients of involuntary manslaughter in commission of an unlawful act. Perry v. State, 78 Ga. App. 273, 50 S.E.2d 709 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).


APPLICATION GENERALLY

FORMER PENAL CODE 1895, ***167;***167; 65, 67 (NOW O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-3) MADE NO EXCEPTION IN CASE OF CONVICTS BUT INCLUDES ALL PERSONS. Westbrook v. State, 133 Ga. 578, 66 S.E. 788, 25 L.R.A. (n.s.) 591, 18 Ann. Cas. 295 (1909) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, ***167;***167; 65, 67).

CONVICTIONS FOR INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER AND CRUELTY TO CHILDREN were not inconsistent because the jury could have found from the evidence both that the defendant maliciously caused the victim excessive pain, and that defendant's actions caused the victim's death, though defendant may not have intended to kill the victim. Sanders v. State, 245 Ga. App. 561, 538 S.E.2d 470 (2000).

VERDICT OF INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER WILL BE REFERRED TO HIGHEST GRADE OF THAT OFFENSE, i.e., manslaughter in commission of an unlawful act, unless jury specifies otherwise. Bulloch v. State, 10 Ga. 47, 54 Am. Dec. 369 (1851) (decided under prior law); Wright v. State, 78 Ga. 192, 2 S.E. 693 (1886) (decided under former Code 1882, ***167;***167; 4324, 4327); Thomas v. State, 121 Ga. 331, 49 S.E. 273 (1904) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, ***167;***167; 65, 67); Register v. State, 10 Ga. App. 623, 74 S.E. 429, later appeal, 12 Ga. App. 1, 76 S.E. 649 (1912), later appeal, 12 Ga. App. 688, 78 S.E. 142 (1913) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, ***167;***167; 65, 67).

MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER ARE DIFFERENT GRADES OF OFFENSE OF UNLAWFUL HOMICIDE. Perry v. State, 78 Ga. App. 273, 50 S.E.2d 709 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

ON TRIAL FOR MANSLAUGHTER, EVIDENCE OF PREVIOUS THREATS OR DECLARATIONS BY ACCUSED IS INADMISSIBLE. Hicks v. State, 55 Ga. App. 149, 189 S.E. 373 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

ERRONEOUS EXCLUSION OF TESTIMONY NEGATING MALICE WAS HARMLESS. --Where in murder trial jury returns verdict of guilty of involuntary manslaughter in commission of an unlawful act without intent to kill, such verdict is equivalent of finding defendant not guilty of murder and thus there was no malice, and also acquitted defendant of voluntary manslaughter and thus found there was no intention to kill deceased; hence, ruling out of certain testimony which defense hoped would negative intent or malice, if error, was harmless because jury found in defendant's favor on issues defendant was seeking to support by answer which was ruled out. Perry v. State, 78 Ga. App. 273, 50 S.E.2d 709 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

UNINTENDED DEATH CAUSED BY UNLAWFUL BLOW WITH NONDEADLY WEAPON CONSTITUTES INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER. --If jury should find that weapon used was one which would not ordinarily produce death, and therefore was not a deadly weapon, and circumstances demonstrated to satisfaction of jury that there was no intention to kill, then, even though blow was not justified, accused would be guilty only of offense of involuntary manslaughter. Huntsinger v. State, 200 Ga. 127, 36 S.E.2d 92 (1945) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).

ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE OF GUN. --If the gun discharged accidently, in the absence of criminal negligence, then no crime was committed and, as the jury was instructed, acquittal was required. Clark v. State, 265 Ga. 243, 454 S.E.2d 492 (1995).

RECKLESS HANDLING OF A GUN MAY BE BASIS OF INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER. Pool v. State, 87 Ga. 526, 13 S.E. 556 (1891) (decided under former Code 1882, ***167;***167; 4324, 4327); Austin v. State, 110 Ga. 748, 36 S.E. 52, 78 Am. St. R. 134 (1900) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, ***167;***167; 65, 67).

SHOOTING, BELIEVING GUN TO BE UNLOADED, CONSTITUTES INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER. Irvin v. State, 9 Ga. App. 865, 72 S.E. 440 (1911) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, ***167;***167; 65, 67).

KILLING TO PREVENT ESCAPE OF PRISONER ARRESTED WITHOUT WARRANT. --An officer killing to prevent escape of prisoner arrested without warrant is at least guilty of manslaughter in commission of an unlawful act. O'Conner v. State, 64 Ga. 125, 37 Am. R. 58 (1879) (decided under former Code 1873, ***167;***167; 4324, 4327).

WHEN DEFENDANT ADMITS ACT BUT DENIES INTENTION TO KILL, former Code 1933, ***167; 26-1103 (see O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-3) deserves special scrutiny. Jackson v. State, 234 Ga. 549, 216 S.E.2d 834 (1975); Jackson v. State, 143 Ga. App. 734, 240 S.E.2d 180 (1977), overruled on other grounds, Bangs v. State, 198 Ga. App. 404, 401 S.E.2d 599 (1991).

SECTION INAPPLICABLE WHERE, HAD VICTIM SURVIVED, OFFENSE WOULD HAVE BEEN A FELONY. --Where, had victim survived, defendant would have been guilty not merely of pointing a pistol at another but of aggravated battery, which itself is a felony, O.C.G.A. ***167; 16-5-3(a) is inapplicable. Raines v. State, 247 Ga. 504, 277 S.E.2d 47 (1981).

HOMICIDE RESULTING FROM ASSAULT CONSTITUTES INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER. --Simple assault being a misdemeanor, an unintentional homicide proximately resulting from such unlawful act would amount to involuntary manslaughter and not murder. Norrell v. State, 116 Ga. App. 479, 157 S.E.2d 784 (1967) (decided under former Code 1933, ***167;***167; 26-1007, 26-1009).
Where defendant unlawfully commits an assault and battery upon deceased, without

Jasp
03-20-2006, 08:24 AM
First, don't represent yourself. Judges and prosecutors don't care whether someone looks smart or not.

Second, I use LexisNexis often and I'm not sure you'll find what you want there. It's mostly personal - filing motions on your own cases and such, not really a public thing where you can view everyone's cases and decisions.

ImperialIPA
03-20-2006, 08:24 AM
It goes on and on.... pm me if you want the full Georgia code on involuntary manslaughter. I included the cases that cite it, so you should have plenty to research.

Hedge
03-20-2006, 08:24 AM
i think he was joking with the involuntary manslaughter..

ImperialIPA
03-20-2006, 08:29 AM
i think he was joking with the involuntary manslaughter..

Im sure of it... which is why I posted some of the code for grins. You don't defend yourself against a felony charge... I refuse to believe that anyone on TW is even that stupid. But the Georgia code on it is highly amusing :)

Fubar
03-20-2006, 11:41 AM
GA Code: 16-11-39 Disorderly Conduct

I don't have time to tell the whole story right now, perhaps I will bump the tread later with the 411, but I still need some info..

I'd like to read some prior cases...look at what judges have handed out for sentance etc.

I am hiring a real Lawyer to defend me and i'm pleading not guilty. If the crazy stripper coked up ***** below me wants to war, then war it is....(teaser)

Blitzkrieg
03-20-2006, 11:47 AM
GA Code: 16-11-39 Disorderly Conduct

I don't have time to tell the whole story right now, perhaps I will bump the tread later with the 411, but I still need some info..

I'd like to read some prior cases...look at what judges have handed out for sentance etc.

I am hiring a real Lawyer to defend me and i'm pleading not guilty. If the crazy stripper coked up ***** below me wants to war, then war it is....(teaser)

You really really have to give people a lot more information in order for people to try to help you.

Searching lexis database for cases where the term "disorderly conduct" appeared was a grand total of 615 cases....are you going to read all 615 Georgia cases????

Describe what happened, try to give us an objective story.

p9Morbid
03-20-2006, 11:54 AM
it's going to cost like $150-$250/hour for a good lawyer. Doesn't really sound worth it to me. Good luck.

Pax
03-20-2006, 12:00 PM
t-minus 20 minutes before pax "the fudgepacking kyke lawyer" turns up.... you may have to draw a company logo in return for his services, however

lol...... it just burns you up inside that I can answer these threads... your jealousy is quite appreciated. :) I am sorry that I not a homosexual and cannot return to you, the same feelings of penis envy that you obviously have for me. Perhaps you and Ptavv, or others, can have your own little "brokeback mountain." Next time, at least resort to a somewhat educated insult rather than the un-intelligent, un-original gobbledy gook you wrote.

Jelly
03-20-2006, 12:08 PM
hrm this could be a good thread ;)

Kizzak
03-20-2006, 12:15 PM
Fubar, Georgia offers access to lexis nexis among other things through the GALILEO (http://www.galileo.usg.edu/) system. If you go down to/call your local library, you should be able to acquire the password needed to login http://www.georgialibraries.org/public/findlibrary.html to find the library nearest you.



Of course you would probably have some trouble being able to look up what you need unless you have some experience with the lexis-nexis or west law systems.

edit: nm, I see you are already going to consult a lawyer :P